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Abstract
Adding generous government supplied beneﬁts to Prescott’s (2002) model with em-
ployment lotteries and private consumption insurance causes employment to implode
and prevents the model from matching outcomes observed in Europe. To understand
the role of a ‘not-so-well-known aggregation theory’ that Prescott uses to rationalize
the high labor supply elasticity that underlies his ﬁnding that higher taxes on labor
have depressed Europe relative to the U.S., this paper compares aggregate outcomes
for economies with two arrangements for coping with indivisible labor: (1) employ-
ment lotteries plus complete consumption insurance, and (2) individual consumption
smoothing via borrowing and lending at a risk-free interest rate. The two arrangements
support equivalent outcomes when human capital is not present; when it is present,
allocations diﬀer because households’ reliance on personal savings in the incomplete
markets model constrains the ‘career choices’ that are implicit in their human capital
acquisition plans relative to those that can be supported by lotteries and consump-
tion insurance in the complete markets model. Nevertheless, the responses of aggregate
outcomes to changes in tax rates are quantitatively similar across the two market struc-
tures. Thus, under both aggregation theories, the high disutility that Prescott assigns
to labor is an impediment to explaining European nonemployment and beneﬁts lev-
els. Moreover, while the identities of the nonemployed under Prescott’s tax hypothesis
diﬀer between the two aggregation theories, they all seem counterfactual.
Key words: Employment lotteries, indivisible labor, human capital, labor taxation, social
and private insurance, aggregation theories, labor supply elasticity.
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1“The diﬀerences in the consumption and labor tax rates in France and the United
States account for virtually all of the 30-percent diﬀerence in the labor input per
working-age person. ... if France modiﬁed its intratemporal tax wedge so that its
value was the same as the U.S. value, French welfare in consumption equivalents
would increase by 19 percent.” Prescott (2002, p. 13, p. 1)
“The Achilles’ Heel? Europe’s generous unemployment beneﬁts ...
German workers typically receive 70% of their take-home pay in the ﬁrst month
of unemployment, and 62% in the 60th month, according to the Paris-based
Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development. And the percentages
are roughly similar for most of the Continent.
In the U.S., by contrast, beneﬁts plunge over time. Comparable U.S. workers
receive 58% of their take-home pay in the ﬁrst month, but just 7% in the 60th
month, the OECD says.” Wall Street Journal (1998, p. R.17)
1 Introduction
Prescott (2002) used a growth model with a stand-in household and the assumption that the
government transfers all tax revenues to the household to argue that cross-country diﬀerences
in taxes on labor account for cross-country diﬀerences in hours per capita. This paper
examines the sensitivity of Prescott’s analysis to his assumptions about private risk sharing
arrangements, labor markets, human capital acquisition, the government’s disposition of tax
revenues, the absence of government supplied beneﬁts to people who withdraw from work,
and the high disutility of labor.1
Section 2 adds an important aspect of the European landscape that Prescott ignored:
government supplied non-employment beneﬁts in the form of a replacement ratio times
foregone labor income. Martin (1996) documents that European governments oﬀer beneﬁts
with high replacement rates and long durations. In our modiﬁcation of his model, a beneﬁt
rate works just like Prescott’s labor-tax wedge (see the multiplication of wedges that appears
in our equation (4)). With the high disutility of labor set by Prescott, beneﬁt wedges of
magnitudes estimated by Martin (1996) lead to depressions much deeper than Europe has
experienced. This good news for Europe is bad news for the ﬁt of Prescott’s model. Prescott
says that the high labor supply elasticity responsible for these outcomes comes from his use
of a “not-so-well-known” aggregation theory due to Hansen (1985) and Rogerson (1988) that
assumes indivisible labor, employment lotteries, and perfect private consumption insurance.
How do Prescott’s conclusions, and the bad ﬁts that result after we extend his analysis to
include those generous European inactivity beneﬁts, depend on that aggregation theory?
1We confess to being biased readers of Prescott’s work because in Ljungqvist and Sargent (2005), we assert
that it is better to account for cross-country diﬀerences in employment rates by emphasizing cross-country
diﬀerences in beneﬁts rather than taxes.
2Mulligan (2001) suggested that Hansen’s and Rogerson’s aggregation theory is not nec-
essary for Prescott’s results because by borrowing and lending a risk-free asset that bears a
suﬃciently high interest rate, a worker can smooth consumption across alternating periods of
work and nonwork.2 Section 3 formulates a version of Mulligan’s argument in a single-agent
setting. We show that whether Mulligan’s time averaging leads to outcomes equivalent to
Hansen’s and Rogerson’s depends on whether human capital is absent (here the answer is
yes) or present (now the answer is no). Introducing a stylized human capital acquisition
technology like those of Shaw (1989) and Imai and Keane (2004) creates a nonconvexity over
careers and allows a stand-in household to achieve allocations with employment lotteries
that individuals cannot attain by time averaging.3 Furthermore, the employment lotteries
and time-averaging models have diﬀerent implications about the identities of the nonem-
ployed and how their consumption compares to those who are working.4 The models thus
point in diﬀerent directions for microeconomic veriﬁcation. Nevertheless in the small open
economy equilibrium setting of section 4, we show that the two market structures (‘aggre-
gation theories’ in Prescott’s language) give rise to virtually identical responses of aggregate
nonemployment to increases in tax rates on labor income. In both market structures, the
high disutility of labor calibrated by Prescott, which we adopt and hold ﬁxed across the two
market structures, delivers a high elasticity of aggregate nonemployment to after tax real
wages (when the government transfers all tax revenues to the households). This ﬁnding is
also conﬁrmed in the general equilibrium extension of Ljungqvist and Sargent (2006a), as
summarized in section 5.
Why do generous government supplied beneﬁts for nonemployment cause aggregate ac-
tivity to implode in the model of section 2 and the employment lotteries model of Ljungqvist
and Sargent (2006b)?5 After all, even when those government beneﬁts are absent, these
models already include perfect ‘nonemployment’ or ‘inactivity’ insurance in the employment
lotteries model, and that causes no such problems. But this insurance is private and the
stand-in household internalizes its costs. In contrast, government supplied inactivity ben-
2Jones (1988, p. 13) anticipated Mulligan’s idea when he wrote: “A natural question to raise here is
that if the time horizons we are considering are suﬃciently divisible, why cannot timing perform the same
function as lotteries?” Jones showed that timing could replace lotteries for an example without discounting.
3As emphasized by Imai and Keane (2004), when we add human capital, the marginal condition describing
leisure-consumption tradeoﬀs acquires an additional term that measures the eﬀect of current work experience
on the continuation value via the accumulation of human capital. From the vantage of models with human
capital, the marginal condition in the model of section 2 is misspeciﬁed, creating an apparent ‘wedge’.
Manuelli and Seshadri (2005) adapt the Ben-Porath model to generate cross-country diﬀerences in wealth.
Their model features a diﬀerent technology for accumulating human capital than the one in this paper.
4Alesina et al. (2005) documented that the European deﬁcit in hours worked per capita relative to the
U.S. can be decomposed into fewer hours in a normal work week, fewer weeks worked in a year, and fewer
people employed. Our analysis focuses on the last component. The large number of nonemployed who are
supported with government funds especially concerns European policy makers. Our analysis of indivisible
labor says nothing about the other two components that reﬂect the intensive rather than the extensive
margin in labor supply.
5For an early analysis of large employment eﬀects of government supplied beneﬁts in a time-averaging
model, see Hansen and Imrohoroglu (1992).
3eﬁts induce distortions because households do not internalize their costs. As we shall see,
in the models of this paper, the high disutility of labor and the resulting high labor supply
elasticity that give labor taxes such potency in Prescott’s model also enhance the distortion
in nonemployment that come from government supplied beneﬁts. They form a package.
Section 6 discusses what to make of the common aggregate outcomes that characterize the
employment lottery and time-averaging models presented in sections 3, 4 and 5. We describe
how the aggregate outcomes conceal important diﬀerences in the lives of the individual
workers whose actions underly the aggregates and how those diﬀerences would lead us in
diﬀerent directions when it comes to calibrating key parameters and seeking microeconomic
veriﬁcation.
Section 7 reiterates why we answer ‘no’ to the question asked in our title, then describes
additional model features whose inclusion we think will explain the cross-country employment
data.
2 Breakdown of Prescott’s model with government sup-
plied beneﬁts
2.1 The model and equilibrium relationships
To explain international diﬀerences in hours worked, Prescott (2002) uses the standard
growth model with a labor supply elasticity set high enough to make employment vary
substantially over the business cycle. In this section, we describe how Prescott alludes to
an employment lotteries model to justify a representative household whose choices exhibit
a high labor supply elasticity; how that high labor supply elasticity also makes Prescott’s
representative household’s leisure choice very sensitive to government supplied beneﬁts for
those not working; and how Prescott’s assumption about what the government does with its
tax revenues disarms an income eﬀect that would substantially aﬀect outcomes. We point
out that adding government beneﬁts while retaining Prescott’s calibrated labor supply elas-
ticity causes the ﬁt of the model to deteriorate substantially, creating the ‘puzzle’ of why
Europeans work so much.






log(ct) + αlog(1 − ht)
i
. (1)
There is a Cobb-Douglas production function with capital share parameter θ and ﬂat rate
taxes τkt,τht,τct on earnings from capital and labor, and on consumption, respectively.
2.1.1 The stand-in household’s budget set with beneﬁts
Prescott’s supply side analysis succeeds in explaining cross-country diﬀerences in hours while
ignoring cross-country diﬀerences in government supplied beneﬁts to people not working.
4To probe Prescott’s statement that he had expected “... the nature of the unemployment
beneﬁts system to be more important” (Prescott 2002, p. 9), we add publicly supplied
inactivity beneﬁts to Prescott’s model. Following Prescott, let pt be the time 0 price of a
unit of consumption at time t, wt the pre-tax wage, Tt the government lump-sum transfer, δ
the depreciation rate, and rt the pre-tax rental rate on capital, and let kt,ht,ct, respectively,
be capital, hours, and consumption per person. Assume that population Nt+1 = ηNt, η > 0,
and that there is a constant geometric gross rate of Harrod neutral technical progress of γ.
We augment Prescott’s version of the stand-in household’s intertemporal budget constraint





(1 + τct)ct + ηkt+1 − [1 + (rt − δ)(1 − τkt)]kt
−(1 − τht)wtht − ρ(1 − τht)wt max{0,¯ h − ht} − Tt
i
≤ 0, (2)
where ρ(1−τht)wt max{0,¯ h−ht} represents government beneﬁts, which we intend to stand
for a broad set of programs for rewarding people who are said to be disabled, prematurely
retired, and unemployed. The stand-in household receives government supplied subsidies for
time spent not working in the form of a replacement rate ρ ∈ [0,1) times after tax earnings
that it forgoes when it sets h < ¯ h. If the household’s hours fall short of ¯ h, the government
replaces a fraction ρ of the deﬁciency of after-tax labor income relative to w(1 − τh)¯ h. We
suppose that parameter values are such that the household chooses to supply labor ht in an
amount strictly less than ¯ h.





ηkt+1 − (1 + (rt − δ)(1 − τkt))kt
i





ηpt−1Nt−1 − ptNt[1 + (rt − δ)(1 − τkt)]
￿
kt.
A no arbitrage argument6 implies that the coeﬃcients on kt should be zero for t ≥ 0, so that
pt−1
pt
= [1 + (rt − δ)(1 − τkt)] (3)
for t ≥ 1, with the value of the stand-in household’s initial capital being p0[1 + (r − δ)(1 −
τk0)]N0k0. The marginal conditions for consumption imply
pt−1
pt = ct
βct−1. In a steady state,




β. Substituting this into (3) and imposing τkt = τk gives Prescott’s
equation (10):




where 1 + i =
γ
β would be the gross interest rate on a tax-free one period bond in this
economy.
6For example, see Ljungqvist and Sargent (2004b, ch. 11).
52.1.2 An altered h − c/y relationship
Prescott’s conclusion that cross-country diﬀerences in tax wedges account for cross-country
diﬀerences in hours depends sensitively on how he treats the consumption-output ratio c/y.
We follow Prescott (2002) and use the household’s ﬁrst-order conditions with respect to
consumption and leisure, and also the constant labor share implied by the Cobb-Douglas












When ρ = 0, this is the same as expression (12) in Prescott (2002, p. 7). Prescott called
this an ‘equilibrium relationship’ because the consumption-output ratio c/y is endogenous.

















2.2 Why do French people work so much?
We use the same parameter values that underlie Prescott’s computations (2002, table 4) to
construct our ﬁgure 1.7 We take the United States as the benchmark economy against which
to measure the employment eﬀects of taxes and beneﬁts. Setting the eﬀective marginal tax
rate equal to 40 per cent for the U.S., Prescott argues that the French eﬀective marginal tax
rate is 20 percentage points higher than the American tax rate. Prescott conﬁnes himself to
the back of ﬁgure 1, where the replacement rate is ρ = 0. There, a tax rate diﬀerential of
20 percentage sends the employment index down to 0.73. So we have reproduced Prescott’s
ﬁnding that this tax diﬀerential can indeed explain why France is depressed by 30 percent
relative to the United States when we suppose along with Prescott that ρ = 0.
When we move forward from the back of ﬁgure 1, we see dramatic eﬀects of publicly
provided beneﬁts.8 At Prescott’s calibration of .2 for the French tax wedge diﬀerential
relative to the U.S., as we raise the social insurance replacement rate ρ above 0, employment
plummets. The model sets the employment index equal to 0.55, 0.41, and 0.25 when the
replacement rate is equal to 0.30, 0.50, and 0.70, respectively. Of course, the French economy
was not depressed by 45, 59 or 75 per cent relative to the United States. With Prescott’s
calibration of the other parameters, setting the replacement rate ρ to one of the values
reported by Martin (1996) makes the puzzle become: why do French people work so much?
7Prescott’s (2002) calibration can be extracted from the numbers reported in his Table 4 together with
equilibrium relationship (4). In particular, we can deduce that α(ct/yt)/(1 − θ) ≈ 1.65.
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Figure 1: Employment eﬀects of taxation and social insurance in Prescott’s (2002) frame-
work. Prescott’s calibration of the United States serves as the benchmark economy where
the eﬀective marginal tax rate on labor income is 40 per cent and there is no social insurance
(ρ = 0).
2.3 Government expenditures, income eﬀects of taxes, and c/y
Prescott’s calibration of c/y is a big part of his supply side story. His treatment of government
expenditures inﬂuences how he estimates c/y in the ρ = 0 version of his workhorse formula
(4). Let g denote ‘government expenditures’ that are not substitutes for private consumption
and assume that g is a constant fraction ζ of tax revenues:
g = ζ[τcc + τhwh + τk(r − δ)k].
We assume that the government returns lump sum rebates of (1 − ζ) times its tax revenues
to the stand-in household. The above formula for g, feasibility, and the formula for the
equilibrium capital stock can be combined to yield the following formula for the equilibrium
value of c/y:
c/y =
(1 − θ)(1 − ζτh) + θ(1 − ζτk)
￿
i




Under Prescott’s preferred value of ζ = 0, this formula simpliﬁes to
c/y = (1 − θ) + θ
￿
i
i + (1 − τk)δ
￿
, (7)
7which makes c/y independent of the intratemporal tax wedge (there remains an eﬀect from
capital taxation). But with ζ > 0, formula (6) activates income eﬀects from the intratemporal
wedge to c/y, income eﬀects that Prescott’s ζ = 0 assumption disables.
Prescott (2002, p. 7) acknowledges that his assumption about c/y substantially aﬀects
outcomes:
“The assumption that the tax revenues are given back to households either as
transfers or as goods and services matters. If these revenues are used for some
public good or are squandered, private consumption will fall, and the tax wedge
will have little consequence for labor supply. If, as I assume, it is used to ﬁnance
substitutes for private consumption, such as highways, public schools, health
care, parks, and police protection, then the ct/wt factor will not change when
the intratemporal tax factor changes. In this case, changes in this tax factor will
have large consequences for labor supply.”
Prescott assumes not only that all public expenditures are substitutes for private consump-
tion but also that the government allocates resources as eﬃciently as when households choose
for themselves.
Although the calculations in ﬁgure 1 accept Prescott’s (2002) assumption that “all [tax]
receipts are distributed lump-sum back to the stand-in household,” it is worth noting that
Prescott (2004) proceeded diﬀerently when he studied the time series evidence for the tax
explanation of the European employment experience:
“All tax revenue except for that used to ﬁnance the pure public consumption
is given back to the households either as transfer payments or in-kind. These
transfers are lump sum, being independent of a household’s income. Most public
expenditure are substitutes for private consumption in the G-7 countries. Here
I will assume that they substitute on a one-to-one basis for private consumption
with the exception of military expenditures. The goods and services in question
consist mostly of publicly provided education, health care, protection services,
and even judiciary services. My estimate of pure public consumption g is two
times military’s share of employment times GDP.” Prescott (2004, p. 4)
The cross-country diﬀerences in c/y that result from that assumption contribute to the
success that Prescott (2004) ascribes to the tax explanation of the European employment
experience.
Thus, as described by Ljungqvist (2005), Prescott’s (2004, Table 2) time series analysis
of the European employment experience rests on variations in both the tax wedge and the
ratio c/y. For example, even in the 1970s, France and Germany had tax wedges 9 and
12 percentage points higher than the United States, respectively. Prescott ﬁts French and
German employment levels that are comparable to those in the United States in the 1970s
only by plugging in c/y’s for the 1970s that were 8 percentage points lower in the two
European countries than in the United States. Thus, a signiﬁcant qualiﬁcation applies to
8Prescott’s conclusion that “an important observation is that when European and U.S. tax
rates were comparable, European and U.S. labor supplies were comparable.” We could
instead say of the 1970s that while French and German tax rates already exceeded the U.S.
rate by about half of the tax diﬀerential of 20 percentage points that were later to prevail
during the 1990s, Prescott’s estimates of low c/y ratios for France and Germany in the
1970s allow the model to ﬁt the outcomes then. If it had not been for those low c/y ratios,
the model would have predicted signiﬁcantly depressed employment levels during the 1970s
instead of the observed outcomes in which both countries’ employment rates exceeded that
in the United States.
2.4 Prescott’s appeal to an aggregation theory
To justify the high labor supply elasticity that he attributes to the stand-in household,
Prescott (2002, p. 4) refers to “some not-so-well-known aggregation theory behind the stand-
in household utility function (1) (see Gary D. Hansen, 1985; Richard Rogerson, 1988; Andreas
Hornstein and Prescott, 1993).” Hansen (1985) and Rogerson (1988) assume indivisibilities
in households’ choice sets for labor, like the models to be described in sections 3 and 4. Em-
ployment lotteries and complete consumption insurance markets imply a stand-in household






log(ct) + φtαlog(1 − ˆ h)
i
, (8)
where φt is a choice variable that represents the fraction of people working and the parameter
ˆ h equals the indivisible number of hours supplied by each worker. This functional form
obviously diﬀers from (1). However, we understand Prescott’s point really to be that the
aggregation theory underlying (8) rationalizes his decision to use a value of α in (1) that
gives a high labor supply elasticity.
Prescott (2006) assigns the same high importance to the aggregation theory underlying
the stand-in household that he attaches to the aggregation theory behind the aggregate pro-
duction function. He emphasizes that both types of aggregation divorce essential properties
of the aggregated function from the properties of the individual functions being aggregated:9
“Rogerson’s aggregation result is every bit as important as the one giving rise
to the aggregate production function. In the case of production technology, the
nature of the aggregate production function in the empirically interesting cases
is very diﬀerent from that of the individual production units being aggregated.
The same is true for the aggregate or a stand-in household’s utility function in
the empirically interesting case.”
9For an alternate view that emphasizes the diﬀerences between using lotteries as an aggregation theory
for ﬁrms versus households, see Ljungqvist and Sargent (2004a).
92.4.1 Insensitivity of results to making disutility linear in labor
We studied how Prescott’s (2002) results would be aﬀected were we to adopt the Hansen-
Rogerson objective function (8). That preference speciﬁcation implies the following equilib-
rium relationship for the fraction of employed households:
φt = −
1 − θ
αlog(1 − ˆ h)ct/yt
(1 − τht)(1 − ρ)
1 + τct
. (9)
Because Prescott (2002) did not provide a complete account of his parameter settings, we also
use the reported ﬁndings of Prescott (2004) when calibrating the Hansen-Rogerson frame-
work.10 Our computations indicate that the outcomes associated with preference speciﬁca-
tions (1) and (8) are similar. As one would expect, because the Hansen-Rogerson framework
has a more elastic labor supply, increases in the tax wedge lead to larger negative employ-
ment eﬀects. But the diﬀerences across the two preference speciﬁcations are not too big in
our general equilibrium analysis. For example, a calculation from (9) that corresponds to
Prescott’s calibration of France yields an employment eﬀect that is 6.5 percentage points
more depressed with the Hansen-Rogerson utility function (8) than with Prescott’s utility
function (1).11
2.4.2 Are employment lotteries necessary?
A high labor supply elasticity is an important part of the reasoning that leads to Prescott’s
interpretation of how cross-country diﬀerences in the intratemporal tax wedge can account
for observed diﬀerences in employment rates. In the next two sections, we study employment
lotteries in more depth with the aim of understanding whether the Hansen-Rogerson aggre-
gation theory is necessary to justify Prescott’s approach or whether it would work just as
well to use an alternative aggregation theory proposed by Mulligan (2001) that allows each
individual to choose alternating spells of work and leisure. Our answer is that Mulligan’s ag-
gregation theory will do just as well, though as we shall see, the presence of a human capital
acquisition technology that features learning by working aﬀects many interesting details.12
In particular, we shall see that while the responses of aggregate nonemployment to labor
10Prescott (2002) uses a capital-share parameter θ = 0.3 but he reports on neither the parameter α nor
the ratio c/y. On the basis of Prescott (2004, Table 2), we proceed here with the value c/y = 0.75. We set
ˆ h = 0.4 as implied by a work week length of 40 hours and Prescott’s (2004) assertion that “on a per person
basis a household has about 100 hours of productive time per week.” Given these parameter values, we can
match the U.S. outcome in Prescott’s (2002) Table 4 by choosing the utility of leisure parameter α = 1.64.
(For comparison, our calibration of α = 1.64 for the utility function (8) is almost the same as the Prescott
(2004) calibration of α = 1.54 in a study using utility function (1).)
11Prescott (2002, p. 8) multiplies an average tax rate by 1.6 to obtain a marginal tax rate. That procedure
fails to follow the recommendation of Mulligan (2001), who noted that because the social planner is consid-
ering variations in the extensive rather than the intensive margin, the average rather than the marginal tax
rate is relevant in the Hansen-Rogerson framework.
12Shaw (1989) and Imai and Keane (2004) are good examples of studies that econometrically estimate
technologies by which work now builds human capital later.
10taxes are similar, the two aggregation theories promote diﬀerent views about the types of
workers we should expect not to be working and when.
To economize on notation in the next two sections, we set beneﬁts ρ = 0, with the
understanding that were we to include a nonemployment beneﬁt like the one in this section,
i.e., as an entitlement to compensation for time not worked up to some threshold ¯ h, ρ would
continue to augment the tax wedge as in (5). Therefore, in our quest to understand how that
high labor supply elasticity depends on the market structure, i.e., the aggregation theory,
that underpins it, it suﬃces to focus on the ρ = 0 case. However, in section 6 we return to
the issue of social insurance when discussing what to make out of the forces behind Prescott’s
high aggregate labor supply elasticity.
3 Aggregation theories: time averaging and lotteries
In this section we show that without human capital, lotteries and time-averaging-with-savings
give similar outcomes at the aggregate level, and in an ex-ante sense at the individual level
too. In contrast, when work leads to human capital accumulation, lotteries give an allocation
that diﬀers from, and in terms of ex ante utility is superior to, the one attained with time
averaging. But in section 4, we show that, despite these diﬀerences in outcomes when there
is human capital, the responses of nonemployment to labor tax changes are quantitatively
similar under both employment lotteries and time-averaging with incomplete markets. Thus,
we conclude that the Hansen-Rogerson aggregation theory that Prescott (2002) emphasizes
is not really necessary for his quantitative results. The high value at which he calibrates
the disutility of labor makes nonemployment just as sensitive to after tax real wages under
time-averaging as it is with lotteries.
We study two arrangements that allow an individual to attain a smooth consumption
path when he faces a zero-one labor supply indivisibility at each moment. One arrange-
ment was proposed by Hansen (1985) and Rogerson (1988), namely, an employment lottery
supplemented with perfect consumption insurance. Another arrangement was discussed by
Jones (1988) and Mulligan (2001) and allows an individual who alternates between spells of
work and leisure to achieve intertemporal consumption smoothing by engaging in risk-free
borrowing and lending subject to a ‘natural’ borrowing constraint.13 Subsections 3.1 and 3.2
describe a basic labor market participation decision and a static lottery model, respectively;
while subsections 3.4 and 3.3 set forth dynamics models without and with lotteries, respec-
tively, all in a physical environment purposefully set up so that all intertemporal tie-ins come
from the presence of the employment indivisibility. In particular, in all of these subsections,
there is no opportunity to acquire human capital. Although there is an indeterminacy in
designing lotteries in the dynamic economy, comparable outcomes can emerge regardless of
the presence of lotteries in the dynamic environment.
Subsections 3.5 and 3.6 study the dynamic models without and with lotteries, respec-
13The natural borrowing constraint is weak enough to make the loan market perfect. See Aiyagari (1994)
and Ljungqvist and Sargent (2004b) for discussions of the natural borrowing constraint.
11tively, in an environment that allows human capital acquisition. Now the outcomes from the
two market structures diﬀer. Relative to the lotteries arrangement, the isolated-individual
intertemporal smoothing model gives worse allocations: depending on parameter values, an
individual consumes either too much or too little. The human capital acquisition technology
confronts the ‘invisible hand’ or planner with a ‘mother of all indivisibilities’ and, if lotteries
are available, causes the planner to preside over a dual labor market in which some people
specialize in work and others in leisure. While this outcome mimics outcomes in Europe in
the sense that a signiﬁcant fraction of workers seem to have withdrawn from labor market
activity for long spells, it diﬀers from what is going on in Europe because in the model such
‘careers’ that specialize in leisure are not carried on at government expense, as many of them
seem to be in Europe. Throughout this section, we set labor taxes to zero. Section 4 adds
taxes to the analysis.
3.1 A static participation decision model
As a warmup, consider a setting in which a person chooses c ≥ 0 and n ∈ {0,1} to maximize
u(c) − v(n) (10)
subject to c ≤ wn where u is strictly concave, increasing, and twice continuously diﬀeren-
tiable and v is increasing, and, by a normalization, satisﬁes v(0) = 0. The following equation
determines a reservation wage ¯ w:
u(0) − v(0) = u( ¯ w) − v(1).
A person chooses to work if and only if w ≥ ¯ w.
In this and all the other models with indivisible labor that we present below, v(0) and
v(1) are the only relevant aspects of v. However, the curvature of u will be important.
3.2 A static lotteries model
Each of a continuum of ex ante identical workers indexed by j ∈ [0,1] has preferences ordered
by (10). A planner (or stand-in household) chooses an employment, consumption plan that






















The planner assigns consumption ¯ c to each individual j and administers a lottery that exposes
each individual j to an identical probability φ =
R 1
0 njdj of working. Letting B = v(1), the
planner chooses (¯ c,φ) to maximize
u(¯ c) − Bφ
12subject to ¯ c = wφ, a problem whose solution satisﬁes the ﬁrst-order condition
u
′(φw) = B/w (12)
that evidently determines the fraction φ of people working as a function of the wage w, the
utility of consumption u( ), and the disutility of work. Ex post, the utility of those who work
is u(¯ c) − v(1) and of those who do not is u(¯ c) − v(0). Thus, the winners of the employment
lottery are assigned to leisure.
From now on, we let u(c) = lnc to simplify some formulas.
3.3 An individual time averaging model
Mulligan (2001) pointed out that the passage of time and the opportunity to borrow and
lend can generate outcomes similar to those supported by the social arrangements of an
employment lottery plus complete consumption insurance. Mulligan’s idea is that with
enough time, averaging over time can imitate the lottery’s averaging across events.14 We
guarantee that there is enough time by making time continuous.




−δt[lnct − Bnt]dt (13)
subject to Z 1
0
e
−rt(wnt − ct)dt ≥ 0 (14)
where δ ≥ 0 and r ≥ 0. We focus on the case r = δ. The solution of this problem equates
consumption to the level (12) that emerges in the static lotteries problem, namely,
ct = ¯ c = w/B, (15)










The right side is the present value of consumption. The left side, the present value of
wages, restricts the ‘discounted time’ spent working,
R 1
0 e−rtntdt, but leaves its allocation
over time indeterminate. Since δ = r, the individual with preference speciﬁcation (13) is
also indiﬀerent between these alternative labor allocations. For example, the individual is
indiﬀerent between working steadily for the ﬁrst △ moments and working steadily for the








14The individual time-averaging models in the following subsections can be viewed as adaptations of a
model of occupational choice by Nosal and Rupert (2005).
13Of course, many other employment patterns also work, including ones that “chatter” by
having the worker rapidly move back and forth between employment and leisure.15
3.4 An intertemporal lotteries model
Now consider a continuum j ∈ [0,1] of ex ante identical workers like those in subsection
3.3. A planner chooses a consumption and employment allocation c
j
t ≥ 0, n
j




























dt ≥ 0. (18)
Thus, the planner can borrow and lend at an instantaneous rate r. We again assume that
r = δ. The planner solves this problem by setting c
j





exposing each household at time t to a lottery that sends him to work with probability φt.




−rt[ln¯ ct − Bφt]dt (19)
subject to Z 1
0
e
−rt[wφt − ¯ ct]dt ≥ 0. (20)
This is obviously equivalent to problem (13)-(14). It follows that there are many intertem-
poral lottery patterns that support the optimal consumption allocation c
j
t = w/B. Only the
present value of time spent working is determined. Among the alternative types of lotteries
that work are these:
1. One lottery before time 0: Before time 0, the planner can randomize over a constant
fraction of people ¯ φ who are assigned to work for every t ∈ [0,1], and a fraction
1 − ¯ φ who are asked to specialize in leisure, where ¯ φ is chosen to satisfy the planner’s
intertemporal budget constraint (20).
2. A lottery at each t: At each time t ∈ [0,1], the planner can run a lottery that sends a
time invariant fraction ¯ φ to work and a fraction 1 − ¯ φ to leisure at instant t.
3. Another lottery at each t: At each time t ∈ [0,1], the planner can run a lottery that
sends a fraction φt to work and 1 − φt to leisure at instant t, where φt is free to be
any function that satisﬁes the planner’s intertemporal budget constraint (20). Only
the present value of φt is determined.
15Nosal and Rupert (2005) study cases in which r  = δ, so that consumption and working schedules are
tilted toward either the beginning or the end of the interval [0,1].
14The indeterminacy among such lotteries evaporates in the next section when by adding
human capital we confront people with career choices.
3.5 Time averaging with human capital
We return to an isolated consumer who copes with the instantaneous labor supply indivisibil-
ity by borrowing and lending. We alter the consumer’s choice set in the model of subsection
3.3 by adding a very simple technology that describes how work experience promotes the












1 if ht < ˇ h,
H > 1 if ht ≥ ˇ h.
(23)
Two solutions interest us:
• A corner solution in which (ˇ h,B,H) are such that the person chooses to set
R 1
0 ntdt < ˇ h.
In this case, the model becomes equivalent with the model of subsection 3.3. The
individual chooses to set
¯ c = wB
−1 (24)
and to work a present value of time at a low skilled wage that is suﬃcient to support
this constant level of consumption.
• An interior solution for which (ˇ h,B,H) are such that the household chooses to set
ˇ h <
R 1
0 ntdt < 1; i.e., the household chooses to become high skilled but also to enjoy
some leisure. In such an interior solution, consumption ct = ¯ c will satisfy16
¯ c = wHB
−1. (25)
16The individual’s ﬁrst-order conditions for labor choice can be expressed as −B +wψ(ht)+θt > 0 or < 0
or = 1 if nt = 1 or nt = 0 or he is indiﬀerent between working and taking leisure, respectively, and where
the Lagrange multiplier θt obeys the generalized diﬀerential equation d
dtθ = −wψ′(ht)nt +θtδ, where ψ′(ht)
is the generalized derivative of ψ. (The generalized derivative of g is the delta function −w(H −1)δD(h−ˇ h),
where δD is the Dirac delta generalized function.) At our interior solution in which the worker chooses
eventually to become skilled, θ0 > 0 and θt rises over time at a constant geometric rate δ until ˇ h, then jumps
once and for all to zero. The multiplier θt is a (current value) component of the worker’s indirect utility
contributed by accumulating human capital at date t.

































1 if nt = 1 and ht ≥ ˇ h,
0 otherwise.
(28)
The ﬁrst term on the right side of (26) is the marginal product of a low productivity
person times the present value of the time that a worker works when unskilled. The
second term is the marginal product of a high productivity person times the present
value of working time when skilled.
Backloading: When r = δ > 0 and (ˇ h,B,H) call for a solution that is interior in the
sense that 1 >
R 1
0 ntdt > ˇ h, the problem of maximizing (13) subject to (21) and (22)















and such that the household sets nt = 0 for t < s and nt = 1 for t ≥ s. Thus, the
household ‘back loads’ all of its work and takes leisure early. To understand why this
is the solution, consider the disutility of work associated with this solution:





Starting from this allocation, consider a perturbation in which the household supplies
some labor earlier and takes some leisure later, but keeps the disutility of labor ﬁxed
at ¯ B. Because of discounting, such a shift allows the household to work less total time
over the interval [0,1] (i.e.,
R 1
0 ntdt would be smaller), but involves working a smaller
proportion of its time as a high skill worker. That would lower the present value of
income associated with a given disutility of labor and so is suboptimal.
3.6 Lotteries with human capital
Now suppose that a planner designs a consumption sharing plan and an intertemporal em-













t]dj dt ≥ 0 (30)
16where each household j has the skill accumulation technology described in subsection 3.5.
A perturbation argument leads to the conclusion that the planner administers a life-time
employment lottery once and for all before time 0 and assigns a fraction φ of people to work
always (n
j
t = 1 for all t ∈ [0,1] for these unlucky people) and a fraction 1−φ always to enjoy
leisure (n
j
t = 0 for all t ∈ [0,1] for these lucky ones).17 The planner’s problem then becomes
to choose ¯ c and φ ∈ [0,1] to maximize





















An interior solution sets φ to satisfy












Consumption ¯ c satisﬁes

















3.6.1 Comparison of outcomes
In the individual time averaging model of subsection 3.5, when (ˇ h,B,H) are such that the
worker chooses the corner solution
R 1
0 ntdt < ˇ h (i.e., he chooses not to acquire skills), con-
sumption given by (24) is less than given in formula (33) for the lotteries economy. But when
(¯ h,B,H) are such that the worker chooses an interior solution
R 1
0 nt > ˇ h (i.e., he chooses
to acquire skills), his consumption level under time-averaging (25) exceeds that attained in
(33) under lotteries. It follows that in the model with human capital, lotteries signiﬁcantly
change allocations relative to the individual time averaging model. In the presence of human
capital, the lottery model supports an allocation with a higher ex ante utility than can be
attained by having the individual alternate between work and leisure and smooth consump-
tion by borrowing and lending. It does so by convexifying a ‘mother of all indivisibilities’,
the decision to acquire skills over individual lifetimes.
17Consider a deviation from this allocation that withdraws a positive measure of workers, lets them enjoy a
small positive measure of leisure, then makes up the deﬁciency in output by assigning work to some of those
who initially specialize in leisure. It can be veriﬁed that this perturbation increases the ex ante disutility of
work component of (17).
174 Taxation under time averaging versus lotteries
We add labor taxation and lump sum government transfers to the model of section 3 and
regard it as describing a small open economy. The government and the agents borrow and
lend at the exogenous interest rate r. We continue to focus on the case r = δ. Furthermore,
for expositional simplicity, we set r = δ = 0 so that the discounted times above now equal
fractions of an individual’s time endowment over the unit interval. Let Φavg and Φlott denote
the fraction of time spent working under time averaging and lotteries, respectively: Φavg = R 1
0 nt dt and Φlott =
R 1
0 φt dt.
The government levies a ﬂat rate tax τ on labor income and balances its budget over the
unit interval of time by returning all tax revenues to the agents as equal per-capita lump
sum transfers. Let T be the present value of all lump sum transfers to an agent.
4.1 Taxation without human capital
The results of sections 3.3 and 3.4 lead us to anticipate correctly that without human cap-
ital, taxation has identical eﬀects on the aggregate labor supply under time averaging and
lotteries, i.e., Φavg = Φlott = Φ. Speciﬁcally, the budget constraints in (14) and (18) become
(1 − τ)wΦ − ¯ c + T ≥ 0, (34)
and, corresponding to our earlier ﬁrst-order condition (15) at an interior solution, the optimal
consumption level under taxation satisﬁes
¯ c = (1 − τ)wB
−1. (35)
After substituting (34) into (35) and invoking T = τ wΦ, the equilibrium labor supply is
Φ = min{(1 − τ)B
−1, 1}, (36)
where we have explicitly included the possibility of a corner solution with Φ = 1.
Figure 2 depicts nonemployment, 1−Φ, as a function of the tax rate, τ, and the preference
parameter for the disutility of working, B.18
18As noted above, we have excluded beneﬁts from the present analysis with the understanding that were
we to include a nonemployment beneﬁt like the one in section 2, the replacement rate ρ would continue to
augment the tax wedge and operate in similar ways as before. This can easily be seen in the model without
human capital. Adding a beneﬁt term alters the budget constraint (34) to
(1 − τ)wΦ − ¯ c + T + ρ(1 − τ)w(1 − Φ) ≥ 0
and makes the equilibrium labor supply become
Φ = min{(1 − τ)(1 − ρ)B−1, 1} (⋆)
instead of (36). Equation (⋆) becomes the counterpart to (9). From the life-cycle perspective that is
highlighted in the model with indivisible labor and time averaging, everyone who is at an interior solution
is also at the margin for taking up those beneﬁts (unless the individual worker is up against a ceiling like ¯ h
in section 2).




































Figure 2: Nonemployment eﬀects of taxation in the absence of human capital, for diﬀerent
values of the preference parameter for the disutility of working (B).
4.2 Taxation with human capital and lotteries
It is easy to modify our earlier analysis of the model with lotteries and human capital to
include taxes. With taxation and r = 0, the expressions for the budget constraint (31) and
the optimality condition (33) at an interior solution in section 3.6 are modiﬁed to become
(1 − τ)w
￿ˇ h + (1 − ˇ h)H
￿
Φ
lott − ¯ c + T ≥ 0, (37)
and
¯ c = (1 − τ)w




After substituting (37) in (38), and invoking T = τ w[ˇ h + (1 − ˇ h)H]Φlott, the equilibrium
labor supply is
Φ
lott = min{(1 − τ)B
−1, 1}. (39)
Figure 3 illustrates an equilibrium outcome when the tax rate is such that the stand-in
household chooses an interior solution to its labor supply.
4.3 Taxation with human capital and time averaging
Substantially more interesting possibilities emerge with time averaging. Depending on the
parameterization and the tax rate, there are three constellations of outcomes: (1) for low
tax rates, everyone chooses to become skilled, Φavg ∈ [ˇ h,1]; (2) for somewhat higher tax
rates, equilibria have the property that a fraction of people choose to become skilled and the

















Figure 3: Equilibrium outcome in the lottery model with human capital for tax rate τ =
0.40. The solid line is the stand-in household’s budget constraint. The dashed curve is the
economy’s resource constraint when a fraction Φ of agents specialize in working. Under zero
taxation, it is identical to the stand-in household’s budget constraint, but not otherwise.
The equilibrium allocation is marked by a circle. The dotted line depicts the indiﬀerence
curve that is attained by agents. The expected value of their leisure is recorded on the x-axis.
The parameter values are B = 1, ˇ h = 0.5 and H = 2, with normalization w = 1.
20remainder choose to stay unskilled; and (3) for a highest range of tax rates, no one chooses
to become skilled, Φavg ∈ (0,ˇ h). These outcomes are depicted in ﬁgures 4 and 5. In the
middle region, the invisible hand uses the fraction of people who choose to work long enough
to become skilled as an equilibrating variable.
As we shall see, in the ﬁrst and third regions, the derivative of aggregate nonemployment
to labor taxes is the same as in the lotteries model. However, in the middle region, nonem-
ployment is actually even more responsive to taxes than it is in the lotteries model because
the fraction of people who choose to work long enough to acquire high skills decreases as
taxes increase.





avg − ˇ h}H
￿
− ¯ c + T ≥ 0. (40)
4.3.1 Low tax rates: everyone chooses to become skilled
Corresponding to the ﬁrst-order condition (25) at an interior solution, the optimal consump-
tion level satisﬁes
¯ c = (1 − τ)wH B
−1, (41)
and consumption ¯ c satisﬁes budget constraint (40),
¯ c = (1 − τ)w
￿ˇ h + (Φ
avg − ˇ h)H
￿
+ T = w
￿ˇ h + (Φ
avg − ˇ h)H
￿
, (42)
where the second equality invokes goverment budget balance with tax revenues equal to
lump-sum transfers. After substituting (41) in (42), the equilibrium labor supply is given by
Φ
avg = min{(1 − τ)B
−1 + ˇ h(1 − H
−1), 1}. (43)
Note that the labor supply exceeds the lottery outcome and that the diﬀerence is increasing
in the time it takes to accumulate skills, ˇ h, and the magnitude of the skill premium, H. But
please note that when everyone chooses to become skilled, the derivatives of the labor supply
with respect to the tax rate are equal in the time-averaging and lottery models (except when
Φavg = 1 and Φlott < 1). This feature is reﬂected in the low tax region of ﬁgure 5.
4.3.2 Higher tax rates: some choose to become skilled, others do not
Panel (c) of ﬁgure 4 illustrates that the highest attainable indiﬀerence curve might have
two tangency points with the kinked budget constraint. In fact, that must be the case for
intermediate tax rates.
Consider an equilibrium with two interior life-time career choices: (¯ c−,Φ
avg
− ) and (¯ c+,Φ
avg
+ )
where 0 < Φ
avg
− < ˇ h < Φ
avg
+ < 1. These allocations must be such that they yield the same
life-time utilities,
ln¯ c− − B Φ
avg
− = ln¯ c+ − B Φ
avg
+ ; (44)

















(a) τ = 0.10

















(b) τ = 0.40

















(c) τ = 0.60

















(d) τ = 0.90
Figure 4: Equilibrium outcomes in the time averaging model with human capital for tax
rates τ ∈ {0.10,0.40,0.60,0.90}. The solid line is the agent’s budget constraint and the
equilibrium allocation is marked by a circle. The dotted line depicts the indiﬀerence curve
that is attained. The dashed curve is the economy’s resource constraint when all agents
supply the same amount of labor (which is identical to an agent’s budget constraint under
zero taxation). The parameter values are B = 1, ˇ h = 0.5, and H = 2, with normalization
w = 1.
22and satisfy the agent’s ﬁrst-order conditions,
¯ c− = (1 − τ)wB
−1, (45)
¯ c+ = (1 − τ)H wB
−1. (46)
When evaluated at those allocations, the agent’s budget constraint must hold with equality,
¯ c− = (1 − τ)wΦ
avg
− + T, (47)




+ + (H − 1)(Φ
avg
+ − ˇ h)
￿
+ T. (48)















¯ c+ − ¯ c− = (1 − τ)wB
−1(H − 1); (51)
while (47) and (48) yield an alternative expression for the consumption diﬀerential






− + (H − 1)(Φ
avg
+ − ˇ h)
￿
. (52)









+ − ˇ h)
￿
. (53)
After substituting (50) and (53) into (49), we obtain an expression for the labor supply that








and the value for Φ
avg







4.3.3 The highest tax rates: no one chooses to become skilled
This equilibrium class looks just like the equilibrium without human capital that we studied
in section 4.1.


























Figure 5: Nonemployment eﬀects of taxation in models with human capital. The dashed
and solid lines represent the lottery model and the time averaging model, respectively. In
the time averaging model, everyone (no one) chooses to become skilled when the tax rate is
lower (higher) than 0.45 (0.88); while some but not all choose to become skilled when the tax
rate falls in the intermediate range [0.45,0.88]. The parameter values are B = 1, ˇ h = 0.5,
and H = 2, with normalization w = 1.
245 Synopsis of a general equilibrium analysis
Ljungqvist and Sargent (2006a) extend our comparison of employment lotteries and time-
averaging to a closed-economy stochastic general equilibrium setting that includes physical
capital, stochastic skill accumulation, and aging. Relative to our models in sections 3 and
4, those extensions enhance heterogeneity among agents and create more diﬀerences in the
identities of the nonemployed workers across the lotteries and time-averaging models.19
The models have stochastic transitions among three age groups, young, old, and retired
workers. There is a stochastic skill accumulation technology between high and low skills
that allows deterioration as well as enhancement of skills. Individuals save claims on capital
that enters an economy-wide production function. There is a ﬂat rate tax on earnings from
labor, which equal a wage times a skill level. An indivisiblity in labor supply is convexiﬁed
either by employment lotteries or individual time-averaging.
The employment lotteries and time-averaging versions of the model share the same strik-
ing implication of the section 4 model that the quantitative responses of aggregate nonem-
ployment to labor tax increases are quantitatively similar, thus reconﬁrming our ﬁndings
about the insensitivity of aggregate outcomes to the ‘aggregation theory’. However, there
are substantial diﬀerences in the characteristics of those who work less as taxes increase in
the lotteries and the time-averaging versions of the models. As taxes increase at low tax
rates, the employment lotteries model assigns more and more old workers with low skills to
specialize in leisure, while the equilibrium outcome in the time-averaging model is that more
and more old workers with high skills stop working. At higher tax rates, as taxes increase,
the employment lotteries model assigns more and more young workers with low skills to spe-
cialize in life-long leisure, while in the time-averaging model the outcome is that more young
workers with high skills stop working. In the time-averaging model, a worker’s age, skill,
and accumulated ﬁnancial assets interact with tax rates to determine when to retire. Thus,
in the time-averaging model, labor tax rates work by aﬀecting the when-to-retire margin.
We shall refer to some of these results again in subsection 6.5 when we come back to
address the question ‘Do taxes explain European nonemployment?’
6 Practical implications of the models
To summarize what to make of our theoretical ﬁndings, this section (1) describes how it
is impossible to include social insurance with the high beneﬁt levels observed in Europe
while maintaining the high disutility of labor favored by Prescott; (2) summarizes what
delivers that high labor supply elasticity in the lotteries and the time-averaging model;
(3) compares calibration strategies for that disutility in the lotteries and time-averaging
models without beneﬁts; (4) criticizes some of the evidence Prescott used to justify setting a
19For another time averaging version of a stochastic general equilibrium model that focuses on the extensive
margin of labor supply, see Chang and Kim (2006). In their model, agents are inﬁnitely lived and, hence, the
life-cycle dimension of careers is absent, but Chang and Kim enrich their analysis by studying two-person
households.
25high disutility parameter; and (5) answers ‘no’ to the question ‘Do taxes explain European
nonemployment?’
6.1 Social insurance is problematic
Prescott (2002, p. 9) summarized his ﬁndings by saying: “I ﬁnd it remarkable that virtually
all of the large diﬀerence in labor supply between France and the United States is due to
diﬀerences in tax systems. I expected institutional constraints on the operation of labor
markets and the nature of the nonemployment beneﬁt system to be more important.” Be-
cause generous social insurance is indeed a pervasive phenomenon in Europe, accounting for
cross-country employment diﬀerences with any model that ignores it is naturally subject to
the suspicion that one has miscast other parameters in order to ﬁt the employment observa-
tions. Figure 1 conﬁrms that suspicion about the stand-in household model with complete
markets and employment lotteries.20
Rogerson (2006a) adds social insurance to a stand-in household model and interprets it
as a subsidy to leisure: “unemployment insurance programs, social security programs and
traditional welfare programs all involve a transfer of resources that is conditional upon not
engaging in market work and hence implicitly involve marginal subsidies to leisure.” We
like Rogerson’s description especially as it pertains to Europe, but we question the way that
he implicitly sets replacement rates for European social insurance programs. Referring to
Prescott (2004), Rogerson calibrates the preference parameter α in the stand-in household’s
utility function (1) so that h = 1/3 at the U.S. tax level, then assumes that ¯ h = 1 in
budget constraint (2). The replacement rate ρ is implicitly determined by his assumptions
about government taxes and tax revenues. In a key calibration that provides an explanation
for why hours of work in Continental Europe are only 2/3 of those in the U.S., Rogerson
assumed that both economies hand back lump sum the tax revenues raised by the U.S.
level of taxes, while the 20 percentage points incremental taxation in Continental Europe
are used to ﬁnance the subsidy to leisure. A back-of-the-envelope calculation then yields a
replacement rate of 15%.21 The low replacement rate that he calibrates is much lower than
the replacement rates estimated by Martin (1996), which are more than 50%. Figure 1 tells
why Rogerson wants a low replacement rate.
When it comes to understanding cross-country diﬀerences in employment and nonem-
ployment, social insurance seems to be the Achilles’ heel of models that have a high labor
supply elasticity. Nevertheless, let’s temporarily set aside the troublesome issue of social
insurance and explore what our analysis in sections 3 and 4 has taught us about the forces
behind Prescott’s high aggregate labor supply elasticity.
20Also see Ljungqvist and Sargent (2006b).
21Hours of work in Continental Europe should be h = 2/9, since those hours are only 2/3 of the U.S. value
h = 1/3. After multiplying the hours worked by the incremental tax rate of 0.2 that pays for the subsidy
to leisure, and then dividing by the number of hours eligible for the subsidy (1 − h = 7/9), we arrive at a
replacement rate on gross earnings of ρ(1 − τh) = 0.057. Hence, given the calibrated Continental European
tax rate τh = 0.6, the replacement rate on net-of-tax earnings is ρ = 0.1425.
266.2 Time averaging versus lotteries
As reviewed in section 2.4, Prescott (2006) assigns great importance to Rogerson’s model of
employment lotteries as a theory of aggregation. But taking our que from Mulligan (2001), we
have shown that this aggregation theory is not necessary for Prescott’s results.22 In a model
without human capital and no uncertainty, households can attain the same allocations by
alternating between spells of employment and nonemployment and relying on private savings
to smooth consumption. This is good news for Prescott’s tax analysis because his assumption
of complete markets with employment lotteries has been questioned and occasionally deemed
incredible.
But the pertinence of the employment lotteries model for Prescott’s tax results reemerges
when we add a human capital acquisition technology. Like the choice of either working full
time or not at all in Rogerson’s (1988) static model, career choices in a dynamic model with
human capital accumulation introduce a kind of indivisibility. The individual who accumu-
lates human capital reaps the returns on that investment by working. By way of contrast, in
an economy with employment lotteries and complete markets, the eﬃcient allocation is one
where some individuals pursue labor careers while others specialize in providing leisure to the
stand-in household. This is accomplished through a grand lottery for newborn workers that
grants the same ex ante utility to everyone but dooms the losers of the lottery to life-long
labor careers.23
In the absence of employment lotteries, individuals are on one side or the other of the
expected consumption-leisure tradeoﬀ in the lottery economy. The individual consumes less
if returns on human capital are too low to compensate him for bearing the disutility of
supplying the labor needed to acquire human capital all by himself. The random assignment
of labor in the lottery allocation implies a more favorable expected tradeoﬀ that could very
well justify human capital investments by the community. In contrast, an isolated individual
works and consumes more only if returns on human capital are high enough to spur careers
with human capital acquisition, because then his optimality condition will favor a longer
working life as compared to the average labor supply in the lottery allocation that smooths
the indivisibility of labor careers.
The diﬀerent allocations supported by time averaging versus lotteries have implications
for the employment eﬀects of taxation. For example, if the equilibria without taxation are
characterized by a corner solution with full employment, successive increases in taxation will
ﬁrst reduce employment in the economy with employment lotteries while the labor supply
22The published version of Prescott’s (2006) Nobel lecture contains an added section on “The Life Cycle and
Labor Indivisibility” that shares features of our analysis in section 3.3. This analytical perspective raises new
issues to be addressed and suggests new empirical facts to be explained. Hence, it is potentially an important
addition to the original lecture, http://nobelprize.org/economics/laureates/2004/prescott-lecture.pdf.
23We thank Richard Rogerson for alerting us to Grilli and Rogerson (1988) who also analyze human
capital accumulation in a model with employment lotteries. The authors cite the story “The Lottery in
Babylon” by the surrealist Jorge Luis Borges, in which an all-encompassing lottery dictates all activities in
a ﬁctional society. The Borges story either arouses skepticism about the real-world relevance of the analysis
or exempliﬁes that reality sometimes surpasses ﬁction.
27in the economy with time averaging is more robust. The reason is that individuals who have
accumulated human capital in the time-averaging economy view the investment as a sunk
cost and are unwilling to surrender the returns on those sunk investments by shortening
their careers. The lottery economy does not exhibit this feature because the lotteries have
convexiﬁed labor careers so that the losers pursue life-long careers and any substitution
toward leisure shows up in the number of winners who specialize in leisure. However, if we
suppose that individuals in the time-averaging economy do choose to shorten their careers
in response to taxation, then the marginal employment eﬀects of taxes are identical to those
of the lottery economy (and even surpass those when taxes become so high that they compel
some individuals to give up on human capital accumulation altogether). Hence, how the
disutility of working is calibrated is crucial for understanding how taxes aﬀect those career
choices.
6.3 Calibration of the disutility of working
In the ﬁrst business cycle model with Rogerson’s (1988) aggregation theory, Hansen (1985)
took the calibration of a model with divisible labor as a starting point for calibrating the
disutility of working. Speciﬁcally, the model with divisible labor was calibrated to match
“the observation that individuals spend 1/3 of their time engaged in market activities and
2/3 of their time in non-market activities.” After imposing the same steady-state hours of
work across the models, Hansen arrived at a calibration for the disutility of working in the
model with indivisible labor.
An alternative to matching the fraction of households’ total hours devoted to work is taken
by Hopenhayn and Rogerson (1993), who calibrate the disutility of working to “produce an
employment to population ratio equal to .6.” For an economy with indivisible labor and
employment lotteries, it would seem that the latter calibration target is the proper one. In
any case, the two approaches share the important outcome that target observations imply
calibrations to interior solutions for the stand-in household’s labor supply. We understand
that those interior solutions deﬁne what Prescott (2006, p. 221) refers to as “the empirically
interesting cases.”
The model with employment lotteries prompts us to try to match snapshots of averages
in the population. The time-averaging model tells us instead to focus on matching household
outcomes over time. The labor services performed by individuals determine their disposable
incomes and consumption rates in the time-averaging model, while they don’t in the stand-in
household model because of the extensive state-contingent consumption insurance. Hence,
it is important from the perspective of the time-averaging model to study the distribution
of labor supply across individuals while, in the stand-in household model, we can just sum
up the labor supplied by all individuals and focus on aggregates.24 In our time-averaging
24The theory of the stand-in household tells us to expect private transfers across individuals: some of them
specialize in generating leisure and others in providing for consumption goods. Shiller’s (2003) vision for a
new ﬁnancial order in the 21st century with privately provided livelihood insurance and inequality insurance
prevails in the stand-in household model.
28model, taxes impact labor supply by shortening individuals’ labor careers. Besides the
eﬀects of diﬀerences in the subjective rate of discount and the market interest rate, the
simple model has little to say about the timing of nonemployment spells – front loading
(“youth nonemployment”), back loading (“early retirement”) or intermittent shorter spells
of nonemployment. However, as summarized in section 5, our numerical analysis of a related
stochastic general equilibrium model with human capital accumulation in Ljungqvist and
Sargent (2006a) suggests that taxes cause early retirement.
The model without employment lotteries raises the question: what should be the cali-
bration target for the length of labor careers? Some might argue that the large number of
people working until the legislated retirement age suggests a corner solution and the disu-
tility of working should be calibrated accordingly. Needless to say, such a calibration would
mute the employment eﬀects of taxation.25 Others might suggest that the employment ef-
fects of taxation manifest themselves largely as having one of two spouses in a household
curtail his/her labor career. Hence, the disutility of working should be calibrated to reﬂect
household composition in the economy.
Much remain to be learned from explicit models of the family, such as the collective
labor supply model of Chiappori (1992). However, one immediate implication of changing
the perspective from models with a stand-in household to models of nuclear families without
employment lotteries is the additional empirical evidence that needs to be addressed before
one can declare any theoretical success in explaining cross-country diﬀerences in employ-
ment. The evidence that we present below does not look particularly promising for the tax
explanation of European nonemployment.
6.4 Prescott’s Evidence for a high labor supply elasticity
Prescott (2006) emphasizes that a high labor supply elasticity is necessary to reproduce
business cycles of the magnitude and nature observed. He says that compelling corroborating
evidence for a high aggregate elasticity can be found in observations on employment and tax
rates across countries and across time, as studied and modelled by Prescott (2004), who is
particularly successful reproducing the observed diﬀerences between France and Germany,
on the one hand, and the United States, on the other. Given that French and German tax
rates in Table 1 increased by 10 and 7 percentage points, respectively, the aggregate labor
supply elasticity must indeed be very high if tax changes are to explain the plummeting
employment in these countries.26 In addition to being an example of a successful application
25Carneiro and Heckman (2003, p. 196) argue that “[i]n a modern society, in which human capital is a
larger component of wealth than is land, a proportional tax on human capital is like a nondistorting Henry
George tax as long as labor supply responses are negligible. Estimated intertemporal labor supply elasticities
are small, and welfare eﬀects from labor supply adjustment are negligible. ... Taxes on human capital should
be increased, whereas taxes on capital should be decreased, to promote wage growth and eﬃciency.”
26Prescott (2006, p. 225) oﬀers a misleading summary of his earlier study (Prescott 2004) when he states
that France and Germany “increased their marginal eﬀective tax rate from 40 percent in the early 1970s to
60 percent today.” Below we reiterate the fact that the actual tax increases were only half of that size and
hence, half of the tax diﬀerential versus the United States was already in place in the early 1970s.
29of the growth model with a stand-in household, Prescott interprets the theory’s ability to
rationalize those outcomes as evidence for a high labor supply elasticity. The high labor
supply elasticity is the key ingredient that makes real business cycle theory work and that
also explains the dramatic fall in European employment.
Prescott suggests that one reason that earlier microeconomic studies failed to ﬁnd a high
labor supply elasticity is that they ignored human capital investments. He refers to a study
of Imai and Keane (2004) for substantiation. Imai and Keane analyze how a human capital
acquisition technology can reconcile a rather ﬂat life-cycle labor supply path with a high
labor supply elasticity, which they estimate to be 3.8. Prescott takes comfort in this high
elasticity. But there is another implication that emerges with human capital accumulation
and that is more troublesome for real business cycle theory. Speciﬁcally, the presence of
human capital weakens the link between the curvature parameter on the disutility of working
and the optimal response of workers with these preferences to ﬂuctuations in the wage rate.
Imai and Keane (2004, ﬁgure 8) forcefully illustrate this with a computational experiment
that imposes a temporary wage increase of 2% and ﬁnds that at age 20 a person with that
3.8 elasticity parameter would respond by increasing hours by only 0.6%. As Imai and Keane
explain, the presence of human capital adds a term representing the continuation value to
what had been an intratemporal marginal condition for moment t labor supply in models
without human capital; the presence of this term means that the wage understates a worker’s
value of time, especially a young worker’s. The response of hours to a temporary wage jump
increases with age, especially towards the end of a career. Hence, the inclusion of human
capital investments in real business cycle models might increase the aggregate labor supply
elasticity but it would be at odds with the business-cycle fact that most variations in hours
are borne by young rather than old workers.27 Once again, this highlights the new set of
interesting issues that arise when we abandon Prescott’s aggregation theory and his stand-in
household.
Although Imai and Keane (2004) oﬀer no simulations of the employment eﬀects of taxa-
tion, their estimated model could conceivably support Prescott’s assertion of potent employ-
ment eﬀects of taxes. Relevant for our analysis of the extensive margin in labor supply, the
estimated age-hours path by Imai and Keane (2004, ﬁgure 3) predicts a sharp acceleration
of retirement already at the age of 50. While we have yet to observe the actual retirement
of the cohort in their study, this prediction is clearly at odds with past data from the U.S.
where retirement peaks have been recorded at the ages of 62 and 65. See e.g. the study of
Rust and Phelan (1997), who attribute the observed past retirement behavior to the U.S.
Social Security and Medicare insurance systems – institutions that are not modelled by Imai
and Keane (2004). Despite our skepticism of their forecast of an imminent early retirement
boom in the U.S., we fully agree with Imai and Keane’s emphasis on the importance of
modelling human capital accumulation when attempting to understand individuals’ labor
supply.
27See e.g. Gomme et al. (2004).
30Empirical estimates of Beneﬁt dependency rates in
tax rates the working-age population
1970-74 1993-96 1980 1999
U.S. 0.40 0.40 0.168 0.137
France 0.49 0.59 0.139 0.242
Germany 0.52 0.59 0.152 0.224
Table 1: Empirical estimates of tax rates (Prescott 2004, table 2) and beneﬁt dependency
rates in the population aged 15 to 64 (OECD 2003, table 4.1).
6.5 Do taxes explain European nonemployment?
Prescott’s (2002) explanation of today’s 30-percent diﬀerence in labor input per working-
age person in France relative to the U.S. posits a tax diﬀerential of 20 percentage points.
From a time series perspective, Prescott (2004) ﬁnds that his theory is especially successful
in explaining changes over time for the two large Continental European countries – France
and Germany – that have increased their taxes by 10 and 7 percentage points, respectively,
between the early 1970s and the mid-1990s when the U.S. tax rate remained constant. (See
Table 1.) But this means that half of today’s tax diﬀerential between France and Germany
versus the U.S. was already in place in the early 1970s when hours worked were similar across
these countries. As described in section 2.3, to explain why those already large early tax
diﬀerentials did not lower European employment relative to the U.S. Prescott estimated a
French-German consumption-output ratio that was signiﬁcantly depressed relative to that of
the U.S. Hence, variation in consumption-output ratios over time and across countries, not
explained by the theory, contributes substantially to the success of Prescott’s account. We
have nothing to say about this exogenous factor and instead turn to discuss how we might
go about seeking further evidence about the particular individuals that the theory predicts
to be nonemployed.
In section 5, the lotteries and time averaging versions of the stochastic general equilib-
rium model with human capital accumulation have some deceptively appealing implications
about nonemployment. In the lotteries model, the eﬃcient allocation prescribes making
older workers who have had disadvantageous labor careers the ﬁrst to be furloughed into
nonemployment as labor taxes rise. This implication seems to conform to some evidence
about employment problems among displaced European workers.28 However, the next wave
of individuals that the lottery allocation furloughs into nonemployment as taxes rise higher
is less convincing – new labor market entrants who are assigned to specialize in leisure for
the rest of their lives. As explained in sections 3 and 4 with a nonstochastic human capi-
tal accumulation technology, the acquisition of human capital gives rise to an endogenous
indivisibility in labor careers that the stand-in household convexiﬁes by allocating individ-
uals either to life-long work or to life-long leisure. However, this counterfactual outcome
28See e.g. Burda and Mertens (2001).
31Figure 6: Employment relative to the U.S. by age in 2000 (Rogerson 2006b, ﬁgure 37).
disappears when we replace lotteries with time averaging. The time averaging model has the
robust implication that individuals respond to higher taxes by shortening their labor careers.
Furthermore, in our stochastic general equilibrium model, the increase in leisure takes place
at the end of workers’ labor careers. Figure 6 depicts substantial empirical support for that
account. The employment-population rates are remarkably similar between Europe and the
U.S. for ages 30-50 years. The young and the old account for the deﬁciencies in European
employment.
But isn’t the observed incidence of nonemployment among the old exactly what is pre-
dicted by our time averaging version of Prescott’s tax model? Yes, but unfortunately there
is a serious mismatch between the arrangement that the theory uses to pay for those ‘early
retirements’ and what actually prevails in Europe. The theory states erroneously that the
workers ﬁnance their nonemployment with either private insurance (in the lotteries model)
or private savings (in the time averaging model). But as is well known, the nonemployed in
the welfare states of Europe are to a large extent ﬁnanced with government supplied beneﬁts.
Table 1 depicts how the beneﬁt dependency rate in the working-age population has changed
between 1980 and 1999. The largest beneﬁt programs in 1999 were disability, unemploy-
ment, and early retirement. The European welfare states have created dual economies that
divide households into those who are gainfully employed and those who are inactive and
living on government supplied beneﬁts. The OECD (2005, ﬁgure SS3.1) reports that in 2000
the number of persons living in households with a working-age head where no one works
accounted for 11.1% and 16.1% of the total population in France and Germany, respectively,
versus only 4.9% in the U.S.
While there are no government supplied inactivity beneﬁts in Prescott’s (2002, 2004)
model, it is important to recognize that the employment eﬀects of taxes hinge critically
on the government’s returning the tax revenues as lump sum transfers to the households.
Those transfers are vast. Their sheer magnitude makes the cost of the progressive proposals
made by some interest groups, especially in Europe, who want the government to guarantee
modest levels of a citizen’s income, or “basic income,” to pale by comparison.29
29As deﬁned by Guy Standing (2004) at the International Labor Oﬃce in Geneva, “a basic income is
an income unconditionally granted to everybody on an individual basis ... regardless of gender, age, work
status, marital status, household status or any other perceived distinguishing feature of individuals.” The
327 Concluding Remarks
We answer ‘no’ to the question ‘Do taxes explain European nonemployment?’ When we
modify Prescott’s model to incorporate the generous social insurance that European govern-
ments oﬀer their citizens to protect them from periods of nonemployment, the ﬁt of the model
deteriorates. We conclude by sketching an alternative view of European nonemployment and
by emphasizing three basic messages of our analysis.
7.1 Our alternative vision
To explain cross-country diﬀerences in employment rates, we advocate using a model that
includes the following features that are missing or diﬀerent from the model in Prescott
(2002): (1) a much lower disutility of labor than chosen by Prescott; (2) other activities like
unemployment, disability, and old-age retirement in addition to the two activities, labor and
leisure, that are included in Prescott’s model; (3) government-supplied inactivity beneﬁts;
and (4) tax revenues that are not handed back lump-sum but rather are used to ﬁnance
public goods and inactivity beneﬁts.
Feature (1) will obviously help make the alternative framework compatible with feature
(3), i.e., the fact that Europe has generous social insurance. Feature (4) will also help by
reactivating the negative income eﬀect of taxation that Prescott disarmed when he assumed
that all tax revenues are handed back lump sum to households. Under our alternative
assumption, tax revenues are used to ﬁnance public good that are imperfect substitutes for
private consumption and to pay for inactivity beneﬁts that, in an equilibrium, are conferred
on ‘marginalized’ groups of the population. In such an equilibrium, the high taxes of Europe
provide little of private value to those who actually pay them because tax revenues either
ﬁnance public goods or accrue to people who are marginalized and not working. Hence,
the negative income eﬀect of taxation would help to keep most people at work and stop
them from planning to arrange employment lotteries with high odds of leisure (in the lottery
model) or to accumulate private wealth with the thought of taking early retirement (in the
time averaging model).
We have already used some of these proposed features in our research on the European
employment experience. Because we are also interested in explaining observations pertaining
to stocks and ﬂows of workers searching for jobs, we have incorporated an additional feature:
(5) a search or matching friction that impedes moving between labor and leisure. Ljungqvist
and Sargent (2005) construct a McCall search model and Ljungqvist and Sargent (2006c)
construct several matching models and a search-island model that are able to match many
idea is partially to protect citizens from the vagaries of the market economy by providing a basic income that
can be supplemented with market activities, if so desired. Some proponents argue that such a reform can be
ﬁnanced largely by reallocating spending from other government programs and expenditures. In the world
of Prescott’s (2002) analysis of European employment, there is no reason either to advocate or to oppose
such a reform: it would have no impact on the equilibrium, since one kind of government lump-sum transfer
would just replace another in the stand-in household’s budget constraint.
33aspects of U.S. and European employment outcomes over the last half century.30 These mod-
els put the spot light on cross-country diﬀerences in the generosity of government inactivity
beneﬁts, rather than on the tax rates emphasized by Prescott (2002).
7.2 Three basic messages
Since our paper contains a number of nuances and qualiﬁcations, it seems appropriate that
we summarize the main lessons in three basic messages.
1. Employment lotteries are not necessary for Prescott’s (2002) conclusion about large
employment eﬀects of taxation. The aggregate employment eﬀects of taxation are
quite similar in the lotteries and time averaging models, even though the identities of
the nonemployed diﬀer. A high disutility of labor and returning tax revenues via lump
sum transfers to households are the critical ingredients for obtaining Prescott’s large
employment eﬀects of taxation.
2. A model with a high disutility of labor is a non-starter for explaining employment
outcomes in Europe with its generous social insurance. A forceful illustration of that
is our incorporation of government-supplied beneﬁts in Prescott’s model in section 2
where employment literally implodes. Hence, it is also important to avoid a common
mistake of not diﬀerentiating between private and social insurance when discussing
possible real-world examples of employment-lottery equilibria.31
3. The tax explanation for European nonemployment has counterfactual implications about
the identities of the nonemployed and how they are ﬁnanced. Empirical observations
support neither the lottery model when it allocates people to specialize either in labor
or in leisure, nor the time averaging model when it asserts that the nonemployed in
Europe are successful people who have amassed enough savings to aﬀord early retire-
ment. The notion that nonemployed Europeans are ﬁnanced with private consumption
insurance or personal savings is utterly wrong.
30However, Ljungqvist and Sargent (2006b) show that it is diﬃcult to get an employment-lotteries model
with a high disutility attached to labor to match the observations. One failure of that framework is espe-
cially informative. Even though the assumed preference speciﬁcation (8) is consistent with a constant labor
supply when wages increase along a balanced growth path, our modelling of a human capital accumulation
technology disrupts that cancellation of the income and substitution eﬀects. We ﬁnd that the labor supply
responds strongly when there is rapid obsolescence of human capital following instances of involuntary job
dissolutions. In the laissez-faire economy, the employment-population ratio converges rapidly to its maxi-
mum because of a negative income eﬀect, while even with a modest replacement rate in its social insurance
system, the welfare state experiences a sharply falling employment-population ratio because of a substitution
eﬀect. The high labor supply elasticity in that framework is evidently at work.
31For a recent example, see Mulligan (2001) who slips by including social insurance in his list of real-world
counterparts to the consumption insurance arrangements in the employment-lottery model: “the sharing
of resources by husbands and wives, sick pay, disability insurance, and intergenerational transfers (both
public and private).” As we have shown, it is a mistake to think that government-supplied nonemployment
insurance helps to implement an optimal allocation either by completing markets or by substituting for
private insurance in the employment lottery framework.
34We are not able to run large-scale policy experiment with real-world economies, but our
models do invite us to entertain thought experiments. The following question comes to
mind. Faced with its predicament of high nonemployment in the last 30 years, suppose that
Europe had to choose either a reform that cuts labor tax rates to the levels of the U.S. or
a reform that replaces its social insurance programs with U.S. style income support. Which
reform would increase European employment the most? Using the stand-in household model,
Prescott (2002) is on the record as suggesting that the solution to European nonemployment
is to cut labor tax rates. We lean the other way and suggest that reforming social insurance
would go much farther in providing incentives for people to choose to work.
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